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Recent Developments

Holmes v. State

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that prior
consistent
statements
which
postdate an alleged fabrication,
improper influence, or motive
were inadmissible under Maryland
Rule 5-802.1 (b). Holmes v. State,
350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554
(1998). The court found, however,
that prior consistent statements
may be admissible to rehabilitate
the witness under Maryland Rule
5-616(c)(2) where the fact that the
statement was made detracts from
the impeachment.
On June 20, 1995, Danise
("Harris")
and her
Harris
roommate, Ellouise Thompson
("Thompson"), met the defendant,
Holmes, as well as Antoine
Awkard, and Miah Lewis
("Lewis").
Harris and Lewis
separated from the group, and
shortly thereafter, a shot was fired
killing Harris. After the shooting,
Thompson gave a written
statement attesting that she did not
see who shot Harris. Two days
later, Thompson gave a second
statement to police indicating that
Holmes had murdered Harris. At
trial, Thompson's testimony was
consistent with her second
statement.
Thompson testified on direct
examination that she originally
was scared to implicate the
defendant in the shooting and that
her fears were compounded by a
visit from the defendant the day
after the shooting. On crossexamination, Thompson's original
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statement was admitted into
evidence to impeach Thompson.
On redirect, the trial court
admitted
Thompson's
prior
consistent statement over defense
counsel's
objection,
and
subsequently, the defendant was
convicted and sentenced to thirty
years imprisonment.
The
defendant appealed, arguing that
the trial court erred by admitting
Thompson's pnor consistent
statement.
On appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
trial court's conviction of the
defendant. The court ruled that
Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (b) did not
codify
the
common
law
requirement that prior consistent
statements, admitted to rebut a
charge of fabrication, must precede
the motive to fabricate. Therefore,
the court of special appeals held
that Thompson's prior consistent
statement was admissible under

Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b). The
Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the intermediate appellate
court's ruling, but on different
grounds.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by noting that a witness'
prior consistent statement is
generally not admissible to
buttress the witness' credibility.
Holmes, 350 at 416-17, 712 A.2d
at 556. An exception to this rule
occurs when the
witness'
credibility is attacked by "an
implication of fabrication or
improper influence or motive." Jd
at 417, 712 A.2d at 556 (citing
City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Knee, 83 Md.
77, 79 (1896)). In such a situation,
a witness' prior consistent
statement is admissible if it
precedes the alleged fabrication, or
improper influence or motive to
fabricate. Jd
The court continued its
analysis by examining Maryland
Rule 5-802.l(b) and the parallel
Federal Rule of Evidence,
801 (d)(1)(b). Jd. at 418,712 A.2d
at 556. Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b)
establishes that "[a] statement that
is consistent with the declarant's
testimony, if the statement is
offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against the
declarant of fabrication, or
improper influence or motive,"
will not be excluded by the
hearsay rule. Jd
The court
emphasized that neither rule
addresses the timing of a prior
consistent
statement.
Jd
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 49
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Therefore, the court looked to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of
Federal Rule 801 (d)(1)(b), from
which Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b)
was derived.
The court reviewed a United
States Supreme Court decision that
held that the federal rule codified
the common law requirement that
a prior consistent statement,
admitted to rebut a charge of
fabrication, must precede the
alleged fabrication, improper
influence, or motive. Id. at 418,
712 A.2d at 557 (citing Tome v.
United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167
(1995)).
The Supreme Court
announced that "'the forms of
impeachment within the Rule's
coverage are the ones in which the
temporal requirement makes the
most sense.'" Id. at 419, 712 A.2d
at 557 (quoting Tome, 513 U.S. at
158). The court of appeals
reasoned that prior consistent
statements which postdate an
alleged fabrication or improper
influence or motive carry little
weight. Id. Therefore, the court
concluded that prior ccnsistent
statements which do not precede
an alleged fabrication, improper
influence,
or
motive
are
inadmissible under Federal Rule
801 (d)(1)(b). Id. at 418, 712 A.2d
at 557 (citing Tome, 513 U.S. at
167).
Next the court of appeals
examined the reasoning used by
the court of special appeals that the
omission of the word "recent" in
Maryland
Rule
5-802.1(b)
signified an intention to break
from the federal rules and common
law. Id. at 424, 712 A.2d at 559.

29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 50

The court opined that Maryland
Rule 5-802.1 (b) was ambiguous
with respect to the timing of prior
consistent statements. Id. at 423,
712 A.2d at 559. Therefore, the
court reviewed the legislative
history of the rule to determine its
intent, and the court found that
Maryland omitted the word
"recent" because its use was
inaccurate. Id. Under Maryland
Rule
5-802.1
the
alleged
fabrication need not be newly
created. Id.
Thus, Maryland
omitted the word "recent." Id.
Furthermore, the court found that
the rule based admissibility of
prior consistent statements on
relevance. Id. (citing Reporter's
Note to the Rules Comm., 125th
Report, regarding Rule 5-802.1,
July 1993, at 188). Generally
speaking, the court determined that
prior consistent statements which
do not precede the motive to
fabricate are irrelevant to rebut a
charge of fabrication.
Id.
Therefore, the court of appeals
concluded that in order for a prior
consistent statement to be
admissible under Maryland Rule
5-802.1 (b), it must precede the
alleged fabrication, improper
influence, or motive. Id. at 424,
712 A.2d at 559.
The court then addressed the
applicability of Maryland Rule 5802.1(b). Id. In order for 5802.1 (b) to apply, a prior
consistent statement must be
offered to rebut a charge of
fabrication.
Id.
The court
concluded that on redirect the State
offered
Thompson's
prior
consistent statement to rehabilitate

Thompson's credibility, not to
rebut a charge of fabrication. Id. at
425, 712 A.2d at 560. Thus, the
court held that Maryland Rule 5802.1 (b) was not applicable. Id. at
425, 712 A.2d at 559. However,
the court held that Maryland Rule
5-616(c), which neither party had
addressed, was applicable. Id. at
428, 712 A.2d at 562.
Under Maryland Rule 5616(c), a prior consisterit statement
may be admitted to rehabilitate a
witness when such a statement
"detracts from the impeachment"
of a witness. Id. at 427, 712 A.2d
at 561. The court emphasized that
when prior consistent statements
are offered to rehabilitate the
witness they are not hearsay
because they are not offered for
their substantive truth. Id. The
statements are offered instead
because the witness' credibility is
increased as a result of the witness'
prior statement. Id. In the instant
case, the court concluded that
Thompson's second statement to
police
detracted
from
the
impeachment of her original
statement, and was therefore
admissible under Maryland Rule
5-616(c). Id. at 428, 712 A.2d at
562.
In Holmes v. State, the Court
of
Appeals
of
Maryland
acknowledged
an
important
loophole by which attorneys may
have prior consistent statements
admitted into evidence under
Maryland
Rule
5-616(c)(2).
Although the prior consistent
statements will not be admitted as
substantive evidence, the practical
effect on the jurors will be the
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same. The use of prior consistent
statements to bolster witness
testimony
and
rehabilitate
credibility will playa critical role
in the ability of attorneys to sway
Junes.
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